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Abstract. Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have recently led to signifi-
cant improvements in many fields. However, DNNs are vulnerable to ad-
versarial examples which are samples with imperceptible perturbations
while dramatically misleading the DNNs. Adversarial attacks can be used
to evaluate the robustness of deep learning models before they are de-
ployed. Unfortunately, most of existing adversarial attacks can only fool
a black-box model with a low success rate. To improve the success rates
for black-box adversarial attacks, we proposed an iterated adversarial at-
tack against an ensemble of image classifiers. With this method, we won
the 5th place in CAAD 2018 Targeted Adversarial Attack competition.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have recently led to significant improvements
in many fields, such as image classification [1,2] and speech recognition [3]. How-
ever, the generalization properties of the DNNs have been recently questioned
because these machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples
[4]. An adversarial example is a slightly modified sample that is intended to
cause an error output of the DNN based model. In the context of classification
task, the adversarial example is crafted to force a model to classify it into a
class different from the legitimate class. In addition, adversarial examples have
cross-model transferability property [5]. The adversarial examples crafted for
one model remain adversarial for others, thus making black-box attacks practi-
cal in real-world applications. Unfortunately, most of existing adversarial attacks
can only fool a black-box model with a low success rate. To improve the suc-
cess rates for black-box adversarial attacks, we proposed an iterated adversarial
attack against an ensemble of image classifiers.
Adversarial attacks are divided into two types: targeted attack and untar-
geted attack. In targeted attack, the attacker generates adversarial examples
which are misclassified by the classifier into a particular class. In untargeted
attack, the attacker generates adversarial examples which are misclassified by
the classifier into any class as long as it is different from the true class.
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2 Related Work
2.1 Fast Gradient Sign Method
Goodfellow et al. [5] propose the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) for
generating adversarial examples. This method uses the derivative of the loss
function of the model pertaining to the input feature vector. Given the input
image X, FGSM is to perturb the gradient direction of each feature by the
gradient. Then the classification result of the input image will be changed. For
a neural network with cross-entropy cost function J(X, y) where X is the input
image and yt is the target class for the input image, the adversarial example is
generated as
Xadv = X − sign(∇XJ(X, yt)) (1)
where  is a parameter to determine the perturbation size.
2.2 Iterative Gradient Sign Method
The Iterative Gradient Sign Method (IGSM) is the iterative version of FGSM.
This method applies FGSM many times with small perturbation size instead
of applying adversarial noise with one large perturbation size. The adversarial
example of the iterative gradient sign method is generated as
Xadv0 = X,
XadvN+1 = ClipX,{XadvN − αsign(∇XJ(XadvN , yt))}
(2)
where ClipX,{X ′} represents a clipping of the values of the adversarial example.
So the results are within -neighbourhood of the input image X. This attack is
more powerful because the attacker can control how far the adversarial example
past the classification boundary. It was demonstrated that the attack of IGSM
was better than FGSM on ImageNet dataset [6].
2.3 Carlini & Wagner Method
This method is named after its authors [7]. The attack can be targeted or
untargeted, and has three metrics to measure its distortion (l0 norm, l2 norm
and l∞ norm). The authors point out that the untargeted l2 norm version has
the best performance. It generates adversarial examples by solving the following
optimization problem:
minimize
δ
‖δ‖2 + c · f(x+ δ)
s.t. x+δ ∈ [0, 1]n
(3)
This attack is to look for the smallest perturbation measured by l2 norm
and make the network classify the image incorrectly at the same time. c is
a hyperparameter to balance the two parts of equation (3). The best way to
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choose c is to use the smallest value of c for which the resulting solution x + δ
has f (x+ δ) ≤ 0. f(x) is the loss function to measure the distance between the
input image and the adversarial image. f(x) is defined as:
f(x) = max(Z(x)true − max
i6=true
{Z(x)i},−κ) (4)
Z(x) is the pre-softmax classification result vector. κ is a hyper-parameter
called confidence. Higher confidence encourages the attack to search for adver-
sarial examples that are stronger in classification confidence. High-confidence
attacks often have larger perturbations and better transferability to other mod-
els.
3 Proposed Method
3.1 Ensemble Attack Method
An intriguing property of adversarial examples is that adversarial examples
generated for one classifier transfer to other classifiers [5]. Therefore, a natural
method for effective adversarial attacks against unknown classifiers is to gen-
erate strong adversarial examples against a large collection of classifiers. We
propose to perform an iterated targeted adversarial attack against an ensemble
of image classifiers. In our solution we give equal weights to each of classifiers.
The classifiers in the ensemble are: Inception V3 [8], ResNet 50 [2], ResNet 101
[2], Inception ResNet V2 [9], ensemble adversarially trained Inception ResNet
V2 (EnsAdv Inception ResNet V2) [10] and adversarially trained Inception V3
(Adv Inception V3) [11]. Our method builds iterative attacks on a loss ensemble
neural networks focusing on the classifiers that are difficult to perturb.
It is a common way to combine a number of classifiers by probability en-
semble. However, it is usually hard to optimize the loss function because the
parameters of different classifiers are coupled inside the logarithm.
Jprob (X, y) = −
N∑
i
yj log
(
1
M
M∑
i
pij (X)
)
(5)
An upper bound is obtained for the loss function by Jensen’s inequality. We
propose to optimize the upper bound instead of minimizing Jprob (X, y). This
way of combining classifiers in Eq.6 is called loss ensemble. The parameters of
different neural networks are decoupled in the new loss function Jloss (X, y),
which is benefit to the optimization.
Jprob (X, y) ≤ − 1
M
N∑
j
M∑
i
yij log (pij (X)) = Jloss (X, y) (6)
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3.2 Iterative Ensemble Attack
The proposed iterative ensemble attack is based on IGSM. We compare our
iterative attack method with different number of iterations. Figure 1 demon-
strates that attacking an adversarial trained model at high success rate requires
more iterations than a normal model. For tasks where computation is limited, we
preassign the number of iterations for each model or dynamically adjust whether
a model is included in each step of the attack by observing if the loss function
for that model is small enough. In Eq.7, δNk ∈ {0, 1} determines whether to
include the loss for model k in the total loss at step N .
Xadv0 = X,
XadvN+1 = ClipX,
{
XadvN − α sign
(
1
M
M∑
k
δNk∇XJk
(
XadvN , yt
))} (7)
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Fig. 1: Iterative ensemble attack results for three selected models.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an iterated adversarial attack against an ensemble
of image classifiers, which can improve the success rates for black-box adversar-
ial attacks. With this method, we won the 5th place in CAAD 2018 Targeted
Adversarial Attack competition. It is easy to make our attack stronger by adding
more models or increasing the number of iterations.
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